Huntington and Portsmouth: Overlapping Metals
No Atomic Workers Part B or Part E claims were paid for West Virginia's Huntington Plant in July. 17. Eighteen Part B claims were paid in Ohio and Six in Kentucky. According to the Department of Labor, $26 million dollar in claims have been paid for the Huntington plant.
http://www.dol.gov/owcp/energy/regs/compliance/statistics/WebPages%5CWEST_VIRGINIA.htm
The Huntington Reduction Pilot Plant (a.k.a. Huntington Pilot Plant) was dismantled in 1978-79 by Cleveland Wrecking after sitting on the International Nickel campus from 1962-1978 on standby.
Certain employees at all four plants (and former facility) are eligible for federal nuclear workers compensation benefits.
Historically, in March 1978 the rupture of a 14-ton cylinder of liquid uranium hexafluoride that was dropped at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant release 21.25 pounds of radioactive toxic uranium hexafluouride.
The highest Portsmouth offsite exposure to uranium came on Nov. 17, 1960 when a cylinder ruptured. According to our modeling of this accident, an estimated uranium inhaled dose of 1.5 rems (0.015 sieverts) could have been received by the maximally exposed resident southeast of the site. Therefore, the uranium isotopes were selected as contaminants of concern for the air exposure pathway.
Historically, demolition of the HPP/RPP began in 1978. At least some of the wreckage and items from inside the structure were buried in trenches in a classified landfill in Piketon, Ohio with guards holding machine guns observing the entombment, the actual activities --- though not the metals and radioactives --- presumably have stayed partly classified.
Thus, the HPP/RPP cannot be fairly compared to PGDP, although the soil breaching of materials from the classified burial section has potential WV interest.
It should be noted that for whatever reason, since the U.S. Enrichment Corp. took over the process facilities at Portsmouth plant in 1993, DOE has not reported process release information or off-site air monitoring data. (ATSDR/CDC, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hac/pha/pha.asp?docid=792&pg=3#envirc2.6 ),
In addition, the study concluded levels were below cancer risk, assuming that no “major accidents” occurred.
(The risk for such chemicals as nickel carbonyl has not been studied by ASTOR/CDC, per footnote.)
One caution --- the evaluation of Portsmouth risks do not calculate surface water contamination. Why? The water surrounding PGDP is not used for DRINKING purposes. Per the CDC/ASTOR:
Leaking process lines have resulted in releases of trichloroethylene (TCE) to a shallow alluvial aquifer. These process lines have been out of service since the late 1980s, when PORTS discontinued the bulk use of TCE. This contamination has not migrated off-site and has not affected nor ever been detected in private or public drinking water. However, the aquifier has become contaminated. The Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCL) set by EPA are exceeded when standards for public drinking water for more than 20 households are applied. Site manages installed a pump and threat facility for removal of TCE prior to reaching Beaver Creek.
The final historic footnote, in 1978, the EPA guidelines for PCB use and waste containment took effect., including the Toxic Substances Control Act, which impacted the three gaseous diffusion plants. When constructed in the 1940s and
1950s, the ventilation duct seams at the facilities were sealed using gaskets impregnated with PCBs in excess of 500 ppm. PCBs in excess Of 50 ppm have also been detected in some of the lubrication oils used in motor and compressor bearings. Lubrication oils are drawn into the motor exhaust system, saturate the gasket material and leach PCBs from the gaskets onto building floors.
At that time, radioactive and co-contaminated wastes were to be disposed in an EPA approved operating incinerator or other approved disposal method.
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/pha/pha.asp?docid=658&pg=1
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/em/2001_Agreements/Paducah_TSCA.pdf
http://www.sem.dol.gov/expanded/SiteProc2.cfm
HPP, SITE EXPOSURE MATRIX, METAL POWDER PRODUCTION
Hazardous Chemicals Associated:
Carbon monoxide CAS: 630-08-0 Aliases: Carbonic oxide; Exhaust gas; Flue gas; Carbon monoxide in air; 14CO; C-14 labeled carbon monoxide; Carbon monoxide labeled with C-14; CO Category: Gases
Review details for this chemical, Hydrogen CAS: 1333-74-0 Aliases: Protium; H; H2 Category: Gases
Review details for this chemical, Iron III oxide Iron III oxide CAS: 1309-37-1; 1317-60-8 Aliases: Iron (III) oxide; Ferric oxide; Hematite; Iron trioxide; Ferric trioxide; Red ferric oxide; Iron sesquioxide; Iron oxide; Red iron oxide; Crocus Cloth; Fe2O3 Category: Other Materials
Review details for this chemical, Neptunium Neptunium CAS: 7439-99-8 Aliases: Neptunium-237; Neptunium 237; Neptunium-239; Neptunium 239; Transuranic; Np Category: Radiation and Radioactive Substances
Review details for this chemical, Nickel Nickel CAS: 7440-02-0 Aliases: Nickel fumes; nickel dust; nickel powder; Raney nickel; Raney alloy; Electroless nickel; L Nickel; Ni-63; Ni 63; Nickel felt; Ni Category: Metals
Review details for this chemical, Nickel carbonyl Nickel carbonyl CAS: 13463-39-3 Aliases: Nickel tetracarbonyl; Tetracarbonyl nickel; Carbonyl nickel; Ni(CO)4; NiC4O4 Category: Other Materials
Review details for this chemical, Nickel II oxide Nickel II oxide CAS: 1313-99-1 Aliases: Nickel (II) oxide; Nickelous oxide; Nickel monoxide; NiO Category: Other Materials
Review details for this chemical, Plutonium Plutonium CAS: 7440-07-5 Aliases: Plutonium-238; Plutonium 238; Plutonium-239; Plutonium 239; Plutonium-240; Plutonium 240; Plutonium-241; Plutonium 241; Plutonium-242; Plutonium 242; Plutonium-244; Plutonium 244; Pu-238; Pu 238; Pu-239; Pu 239; Pu-240; Pu 240; Pu-241; Pu 241; Pu-242; Pu 242; Pu-244; Pu 244; Transuranic; Pu; Product Category: Radiation and Radioactive Substances
Review details for this chemical, Thorium Thorium CAS: 7440-29-1 Aliases: Thorium-228; Thorium 228; Th-228; Th 228; Thorium-229; Thorium 229; Th-229; Th 229; Th-229 tracer; Th 229 tracer; Thorium-230; Thorium 230; Th-230; Th 230; Ionium; Thorium-232; Thorium 232; Th-232; Th 232; Thorium-234; Thorium 234; Th-234; Th 234; Th Category: Radiation and Radioactive Substances
Review details for this chemical, Uranium Uranium CAS: 7440-61-1 Aliases: U-232 tracer; U 232 tracer; Uranium-233; Uranium 233; Uranium-234; Uranium 234; Uranium-235; Uranium 235; Uranium-236; Uranium 236; Uranium-238; Uranium 238; The metal; EU (enriched); Oralloy (enriched); Tuballoy (natural); D-38 (depleted); D 38 (depleted); Staballoy (depleted); Depleted uranium; Tube alloy; Q metal; U; U-232; U 232; U-233; U 233; U-234; U 234; U-235; U 235; U-236; U 236; U-238; U 238 Category: Radiation and Radioactive Substances
BUILDINGS IN WHICH THIS PROCESS/ACTIVITY OCCURRED
Review details about this building, Main Process Building Main Process Building Aliases: Process Building
LABOR CATEGORIES PERFORMING THIS PROCESS/ACTIVITY
Review details about this labor category, Operator Operator
PORTSMOUTH HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS FROM URANIUM RECOVERY, RECYCLING and MAINTENANCE
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| BUILDINGS IN WHICH THIS PROCESS/ACTIVITY OCCURRED |
|
HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS AT PORTSMOUTH
RELATED TO PROCESS SMELTING
| HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS POTENTIALLY RELATED TO THIS PROCESS/ACTIVITY |
|
||||||||||||||||||
| BUILDINGS IN WHICH THIS PROCESS/ACTIVITY OCCURRED |
|
Paducah AND SMELTING
AIRBORNE NICKEL
However, another two plants did have some similar functions and handled some similar metals/chemicals as evidenced by NIOSH/CDC/DOE documents. Huntington recycled material from the gaseous diffusion plants. The most updated determination includes numerous radioisotopes.
As a for instance, the PGDP operated smelters to recycle scrap materials. The CDC/ASTOR analysis concluded that the Paducah exposures on site and off (by air) were well below the levels for cancer risk and health concerns. (SEE: http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hac/pha/pha.asp?docid=792&pg=12#appi )
One question asked by residents near was:)
I read the recently released Health Consultation titled Exposure Assessment of Airborne Nickel and other Metal Particulates from Historic Smelter Operations at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and have the following observations and recommendations for your review,
Comment: During the referenced time frame (1962-19 the PGDP did operate smelters in theC-746A building for recycling materials but most of the scrap was processed to destroy or disguise the classified nature of the scrap. Another smelter operated in t986), the C-340 complex to produce uranium alloys for use by the DOD and AEC. Though it is presented as a total review of smelting operations at the PGDP I found no mention of the uranium smelter in the document. The processing of other materials is very important since some materials handled in these units was far more dangerous (e.g.organics, beryllium components and uranium) and the cumulative problem presented by all operations must be studied and quantified. Were conditions "beyond the fence" terribly bad? I don't know but I had hoped that those with the expertise to evaluate the situation would be given all available information by the DOE.
ATSDR Response: This consultation specifically addresses releases from the C-746Asmelters. Appropriate revisions have been made to clarify the purpose of the health consultation. Releases from uranium metal operations at the C-340 complex were evaluatedas part of total uranium releases from the entire PGDP facility and are included in the PGDP Public Health Assessment.
As you have indicated there was a uranium metal production operation in building C-340.1985 annual uranium emissions from the C-340 operations are provided in Table 1 of the1985 Environmental Monitoring Report [14]. Annual emission values for U234, U235, andU238 are 7.1E-6, 3.3E-7, 2.6E-5 Ci/yr, respectively. As these values are all at least 10,000times lower than the emissions from other previously evaluated sources (C-310 stack, C-400group, seal/wet air exhaust, C-710 laboratory) for earlier years (1956-59), they do not comprise a significant additional source of radionuclide emissions (see Table E-1 in Appendix E for uranium values evaluated for specific release years). For example, the previously evaluated 1956 annual releases included 1.6 Ci/yr for U234, 0.08 Ci/yr forU235, and 3.5 Ci/yr for U238.
As the much higher 1956 releases did not result in off-site exposures of public health concern, the measured 1985 emissions from uranium metal production in C-340 are below levels of public health concern. We will make appropriate revisions in the Public Health Assessment document to ensure that potential releases from C-340 uranium operations are explicitly referenced even though such emissions do not constitute a significant source.
Activities of radiological contaminants…from nickel samples [2] are used to determine the quantity of radionuclides released during nickel smelting".
Comment: Using the level of radioactive materials in the nickel ingots is completely invalid. If this was information provided by DOE then I am deeply saddened and insulted as member of the public. It was demonstrated in lab tests conducted before the major melting campaigns began that radioactive materials were highly concentrated at the top of the melt (subjecting it to greater release than from the body of the melt) and subsequently removed as slag. The highly radioactive nature ofthe slag was the subject of internal documents and safety guidance. At a minimum the worst-case concentration should be used to see if there might have been a problem(perhaps modeling the elevated concentrations in the slag might show there were no problems at all).
The odd thing about some of the slag was it's tendency to roll onto the surface of the melt in the form of golf ball sized spheres which were sometimes kept as souvenirs on worker's desk. A more accurate estimation of releases could be made by having the sespheres tested (they are still around, no pun intended) or better still performing amass balance (drums of flakes were weighed and sampled before and ingots were tested after they were cast so total material lost could be estimated). [redacted name]in the C-710 building closely studied distribution of materials within the melting process and his documents detail his findings (a search of the database using his name as the author should kick out some good information, e.g. K/TL 338-339-443 and K/PS230). If nothing is easily available I could provide some of the analytical resuted from the testing done.
ATSDR Response: The Comment or is correct that radionuclide concentrations in the nickel buttons underestimate the total radionuclide concentration of the feed material due to segregation in the slag and nickel ingots. However, as stated in the above response to item 1,radionuclide stack emissions were also directly measured. Annual emissions from the C-746A stack are reported for the calender year 1985 [14]. As these values are all at least five orders of magnitude lower than the emissions from other previously evaluated sources for earlier years (1956-59), they do not comprise a significant additional source of radionuclide emissions (see Table E-1 in Appendix E for uranium values evaluated for specific release years).
Pre-K through 8th Grade
Enrolling Now for 2017-2018!
Call 304-522-2644 for further information
